Bitcoin is the currency of the Internet: a distributed, worldwide, decentralized digital money. Unlike traditional currencies such as dollars, bitcoins are issued and managed without any central authority whatsoever: there is no government, company, or bank in charge of Bitcoin. With Bitcoin, you can be your own bank. If you are new to Bitcoin, try btc (the recommended subreddit for censorship resistant bitcoin discussion), Bitcoin.com Wiki or find more info at Bitcoin.com.
A community dedicated to Bitcoin, the currency of the Internet. Bitcoin is a distributed, worldwide, decentralized digital money. Bitcoins are issued and managed without any central authority whatsoever: there is no government, company, or bank in charge of Bitcoin. You might be interested in Bitcoin if you like cryptography, distributed peer-to-peer systems, or economics. A large percentage of Bitcoin enthusiasts are libertarians, though people of all political philosophies are welcome.
Hey hey r/bitcoin! I'm trying to figure out how this Bitcoin Node Software is determining accurate count inaccurate counts from nodes. It's being used to count the number of nodes on bitcoin and I think is a very important argument when discussing the strength of the Bitcoin help. Any thoughts? 📚
Has the concept of proscribed scripts been considered for Bitcoin?
I had the shower-thought that, if there was a particular popular script that was often used, the hash of that script could be included in bitcoin node software so that the script body itself didn't have to be sent alongside the transaction that evaluates that script, and doesn't then need to be recorded in blocks either. This would be an efficiency improvement. This could even be generalized into something like a script-cache, where nodes are expected to dynamically build up a list of scripts used in transactions in a deterministic way (where all nodes have the exact same cache of scripts) so that new popular scripts can take advantage of this optimization without a consensus change. Has such an idea been discussed before?
Bitcoin API to Easily Create Your Bitcoin Wallet - Tokenview
What is a Bitcoin Wallet?
Simply put, a Bitcoin wallet is actually a 'management tool for private keys, addresses, and blockchain data.' The private key is generated from a random number, and the address is calculated from the private key. The bitcoins received and transferred from the wallet (address) must also be listed. Of course, the wallet must also support collection and payment. In other words, all of these have to be done through tools, and these types of tools are collectively referred to as 'bitcoin wallets.' ViewToken can not only predict the market of virtual currencies, but also help users earn more digital assets through financial management, and can directly use the ViewToken flash swap function, eliminating the hassle of exchange on exchanges. At present, digital currency wallets have different functions. According to the maintenance method of blockchain data, we can divide wallets into:
Full nodes (such as bitcoin-core core wallet), maintain all blockchain data (currently above 50GB), fully decentralized, and synchronize all data;
SPV light wallets (such as the viewtoken wallet), only maintain the blockchain data related to itself, are basically decentralized (rely on other full nodes on the Bitcoin network), and only synchronize data related to themselves;
The centralized wallet does not rely on the Bitcoin network, but only depends on its own centralized server, and does not synchronize data. All data is obtained from its own centralized server;
According to the hardware equipment used, we can divide the wallet into:
Computer wallet, wallet software runs on desktop operating systems (Windows, MacOS, Linux, etc.);
Mobile wallet, Android, iOS, etc.;
Online wallet, running and cloud service, the private key is encrypted and stored on the server, and accessed through the browser;
Hardware wallet, running on specially customized hardware, may need to be used in conjunction with a computer or mobile phone.
Bitcoin Wallet development and Address Management
In Bitcoin application development, how to query the details of a Bitcoin address and how to query all transactions that occurred on the Bitcoin address? How to query all transactions that occurred in a specified Bitcoin address? How to manage Bitcoin addresses? Here is the solution:
Bitcoin transaction data is stored in a private database
Due to the data storage structure of Bitcoin, it is impossible to directly use the original API of Bitcoin to query historical transaction data of a specified address. Therefore, the most simple first solution is to store each transaction data on the Bitcoin blockchain in its own database, and then index the transaction address information (such as Scriptpubkey, pubkey, or the address itself), so that You can query the database freely and efficiently.
Use third-party Bitcoin wallet API interface
The previous method requires users to be able to parse the Bitcoin blockchain data and build a database environment by themselves, but it is more cumbersome and requires certain technical requirements. Many users basically do not use this method. Third-party API data services can solve this problem. Users can directly access the Tokenview blockchain API data service page, choose the appropriate API interface according to their own needs, and easily develop Bitcoin wallets and manage wallet addresses.
Bitcoin node implementation software
Users can choose a third solution to obtain Bitcoin address information and management: Bitcoin node implementation software. Such as btcd, this method uses the Bitcoin node software implemented in the go language when starting btcd. Just use the --addrindex flag to automatically create a Bitcoin address index.
The latest propaganda piece by Bitcoin ABC: "After the upgrade, Bitcoin ABC software will continue to be fully compatible with the Bitcoin Cash protocol, whereas alternative node implementations will become BCH-incompatible."
Hard coded UTXO checkpoints are the way to go. They're safe. They're necessary.
Update 3: Pieter convinced me in the comments of his Stack Exchange answer that these checkpoints don't give any material improvement over assumevalid and assumeutxo. He made me realize why my Case IV below would not actually cause a huge disruption for assumevalid users. So I rescind my call for UTXO checkpoints. However, I maintain that UTXO checkpoints done properly (with checkpoints sufficiently in the past) are not a security model change and would not meaningfully alter consensus. It sounded like Pieter agreed with me on that point as well. I think UTXO checkpoints might still be a useful tool I will call for Assume UTXO tho. It plus assumevalid adds pretty much much all the same benefits as my proposal. OP: Luke Jr has been proposing lowering the maximum block size to 300mb in order to limit how long it takes a new node to sync up. He makes the good point that if processor power is growing at only 17%/year, that's how much we can grow the number of transactions a new node needs to verify on initial sync. But limiting the blocksize is not the only way to do it. As I'm sure you can foresee from the title, I believe the best way to do it is a hardcoded checkpoint built into the software (eg bitcoin core). This is safe, this is secure, and it is a scalability improvement that has no downsides. So what is a hardcoded checkpoint? This would consist of a couple pieces of data being hardcoded into the source code of any bitcoin full-node software. The data would be a blockheight, block hash, and UTXO hash. With those three pieces of information, a new client can download the block at that height and the UTXO set built up to that height, and then it can verify that the block and UTXO set are correct because they both have the correct hashes. This way, a new node can start syncing from that height rather than from the first block ever mined. What does this improve?
Less storage - nodes don't need to store the entire historical chain through the eons. Just very recent blocks.
Initial sync time is massively reduced
Initial sync time would scale linearly with the transaction rate (whereas now it scales linear with number of total transactions).
While not strictly necessary, its likely that the UTXO data would come from the same source as the software, since otherwise full nodes would have to store UTXO sets at multiple block heights just in case someone asks for it as part of their checkpoint. Also, full-nodes should store block information going back historically significantly further than their checkpoint, so they have data to pass to clients that have an earlier checkpoint. So perhaps if a client is configured for a checkpoint 6 months ago, it should probably still store block data from up to 2 years ago (tho it wouldn't need to verify all that data - or rather, verifying it would be far simpler because the header chain connecting to their checkpoint block would all that needs to be validated). To be perfectly clear, I'm absolutely not suggesting a live checkpoint beacon that updates the software on-the-fly from a remote source. That is completely unsafe and insecure, because it forces you to trust that one source. At any time, whoever controls the live source could disrupt millions of people by broadcasting an invalid block or a block on a malicious chain. So I'm NOT suggesting having a central source, or even any distributed set of sources, that automatically send checkpoint information to clients that connect to it. That would 100% be unsafe. What I'm suggesting is a checkpoint hardcoded into the software, which can be safely audited. So is a hardcoded checkpoint safe and secure? Yes it is. Bitcoin software already needs to be audited. That's why you should never use bitcoin software that isn't open source. So by including the three pieces of data described above, all you're doing is adding a couple more things that need to be audited. If you're downloading a bitcoin software binary without auditing it yourself, then you already take on the risk of trusting the distributor of that binary, and adding hardcoded checkpoints does not increase that risk at all. However, most people can't even audit the bitcoin software if they wanted to. Most people aren't programmers and can't feasibly understand the code. Not so for the checkpoints. The checkpoints could easily be audited by anyone who runs a full node, or anyone who can check block hashes and UTXO hashes from multiple sources they trust. Auditing the hardcoded checkpoint would be so easy we could sell T shirts that say "I helped audit Bitcoin source code!" The security profile of a piece of bitcoin node software with hardcoded checkpoints or without hardcoded checkpoints is identical. Not similar. Not almost. Actually identical. There is no downside. Imagine this twice-a-year software release process: Month 0: After the last release, development on the next release start (or rather, continues). Month 3: The next candidate version of the software is finalized, including a checkpoint from some non-contentious distance ago, say 1 month ago. Month 6: After 3 months of auditing and bug fixing, the software is released. At this point, the checkpoint would be 4 months old. In this process, downloading the latest version of bitcoin software would mean the maximum months of blocks you have to sync is 10 months (if you download and run the software the day before the next release happens). This process is safe, its secure, its auditable, and it saves tons of processing time and harddrive space. This also means that it would allow bitcoin full nodes to be run by lower-power computers, and would allow more people to run full nodes. I think everyone can agree that outcome would be a good one. So why do we need this change? Because 300kb blocks is the alternative. That's not enough space, even with the lightning network. I'm redacting the previous because I don't have the data to support it and I don't think its necessary to argue that we need this change. So why do we need this change? This change represents a substantial scalability improvement from O(n) to O(Δn). It removes a major bottleneck to increasing on-chain transaction throughput, reducing fees, increasing user security as well as network-wide security (through more full nodes), or a combination of those. What does everyone think? Update: I think its useful to think of 4 different types of users relevant in the hypothetical scenario where Bitcoin adopts this kind of proposal:
Upfront Auditors - Early warnings
After-the-fact Auditors - Late warnings
Non-full-auditors - Late warnings
Non full nodes - No warnings
Upfront auditors look at the source code of the software they use, the keep up to date with changes, and they make sure that what they're running looks good to them. They're almost definitely building directly from source code - no binaries for them. They'll alert people to a problem potentially before buggy or malicious software is even released. In this scenario, their security is obviously unchanged because they're not taking advantage of the check-pointing feature. We want to encourage as many people as possible to do this and to make it as easy as possible to do. After-the-fact Auditors want to start a new node and start using Bitcoin immediately. They want to audit, but are ok with a period of time where they're trusting the code to be connecting the chain they want. They take on a slight amount of personal risk here, but once they back-validate the chain, they can sound the alert if there is a validation problem. Non-full-auditors are simply content to trust that the software is good. They'll run the node without looking at most or any of the code. They take on more risk than After-the-fact Auditors, but their risk is not actually much worse than After-the-fact Auditors. Why? Because as soon as you're sure you're on the right chain (ie you do a few monetary transactions with people who accept your bitcoin), you're golden for as long as you use that node and the part of the chain it validated. The can also still help the network to pretty much the same degree as After-the-fact Auditors, because if there are a problem with their transactions, they can sound the alarm about a problem with that software. Non full nodes obviously have less security and they don't help the network. So why did I bother to talk about these different types of users? Well, we obviously want as many Upfront auditors as possible. However, doing that out of the starting gate is time consuming. It takes time to audit the code and time to sync the blockchain. Its costly. For this reason, for better or worse, most people simply won't do it. Without checkpoints, we don't have type 2 or type 3 users. The only alternative to being an Upfront Auditor is to be an SPV node that doesn't help the network and is less secure. With checkpoints, we could potentially change many of those people who would just use SPV to doing something much more helpful for the network. One of the huge benefits of After-the-fact Auditors and Non-full-auditors is that once they're on the network, they can act like Upfront Auditors in the next release. Maybe they're not auditing the source code, but they can sure audit the checkpoint very easily. That means they can also sound the alarm before malicious or broken software is released, just like Upfront Auditors. Why? Because they now have a chain they believe to be the true one (with an incredibly high degree of confidence). What this means is that Upfront Auditors, After-the-fact Auditors, and Non-full-auditors help the network to a very similar degree. If software that doesn't sync to the right chain, they will find out about it and alert others. Type 2 and 3 take on personal risk, but they don't put the network at greater risk, like SPV nodes do. If we can convert most Non-full nodes into Type 2 or Type 3 users, that would be massive gain for the security of Bitcoin. Luke Jr said it himself, making nodes that support the network as easy as possible to run is critical. This is one good way to do that. Update 2: Comparison to -assumevalid and why using checkpoints upgrades scalability The -assumevalid option allows nodes to skip validation of blocks before the hardcoded golden block hash. This is similar to my proposal, but has a critical difference. A node with -assumevalid on (which I've heard is the default now) will still validate the whole chain in the case that a longer chain is floating around. Because of this, -assumevalid can be an optimization that works as long as there's no other longer chain also claiming to be bitcoin floating around the network. The important points brought up by the people that wrote and discussed adding this feature was that: A. Its not a change in security model, and B. Its not a change in consensus rules. This meant that it was a pure implementation detail that would never and could never change what chain your node follows. The checkpoints I'm describing are different. On point A, some have said that checkpoints are a security model change, and I've addressed that above. I'd like to add that there is no way for bitcoin to be 100% trustless. That is impossible. Bitcoin at the deepest level is a specified protocol many people have agreed to use together. In order to join that group even on the most fundamental level, you need to find the spec people are agreeing to use. You have to trust that the person or people that gave you a copy of that spec gave you the right one. If different people claim that different specs are "bitcoin", you have to choose which people to trust. The same is true of checkpoints. New entrants want to join the network that the people they care about interacting with believe is Bitcoin, and those are the people they will trust to get the spec, or the source code, or the hash of the UTXO set. This is why I say the security profile of Bitcoin with checkpoints is identical to Bitcoin without checkpoints. The amount of trust you have to put in your social network is not materially different. While its not a security model change, as I've supported above, using checkpoints is consensus rules change. Every new checkpoint would change the consensus rules. However, I would argue this isn't a problem as long as those checkpoints are at a non-contentious number of blocks ago. While it would change consensus rules, it should not change consensus at all. There are 4 scenarios to consider: I. There's no contention. II. There's a long-range reorg from before the checkpoint. III. There exists a contentious public chain that branched before the checkpoint would usually be taken. IV. There exists an invalid chain that's longer than the valid chain. In case I, none of it matters, and checkpoints have pretty much exactly the same result as -assumevalid. In case II, Bitcoin has much bigger problems. Its simply unacceptable for Bitcoin to allow for long-range reorgs, so this case must be prevented entirely. The downsides of a long-range reorg for bitcoin without checkpoints is MUCH MUCH larger than the additional downsides with checkpoints. In case III, the obvious solution is to checkpoint from an earlier non-contentious blockheight, so nodes validate both chains. Case IV is where things really differ between checkpoints and -assumevalid. In this case, nodes using a checkpoint will only validate blocks after the checkpoint. However, nodes using -assumevalid will be forced to validate both chains back to their branch-point. I don't believe there are other relevant cases, but as long as checkpoints are chosen from non-contentious heights and have time to be audited, there is no possibility that honestly-run bitcoin software would in any way affect the consensus for what chain is the right chain. This brings me back to why checkpoints upgrades scalability, and -assumevalid does not. Case IV is the case that prevents -assumevalid from being a scalability improvement. You want new nodes to be able to sync to the network relatively quickly, so say the 90th percentile of machines should be able to do it in less than a week (or maybe we want to ensure sync happens within a day - that's up for debate). With checkpoints, invalid chains branched before the checkpoint will not disrupt new entrants to the network. With -assumevalid, those invalid change will disrupt new entrants. Since an invalid chain can have branched arbitrarily far in the past, this disruption could be arbitrarily large. One way to deal with this is to ensure that most machines can handle validating not only the whole valid chain, but the whole invalid chain as well. The other way to deal with this is checkpoints. So back to scalability, with checkpoints all we need to ensure is that the lowest power machines we want to support can sync in a timely manner back to the checkpoint.
Disclaimer **No consensus changes**. Here is a full list of v1.0.5 changes:
Journaling block assembler has been modified so that it now only includes a transaction if the supplied fees are greater than, or equal to minblocktxfee. It is also now the default.
Free consolidation transactions. Multiple transactions can, under some circumstances, be consolidated into a single transaction at no cost, to minimise the size of the UTXO set. Free consolidation transactions cannot be used with CPFP.
sendrawtransaction – The node now supports the submission of multiple transactions in a single RPC call. I.e. there is a new RPC call sendrawtransactions.
Update dust relay fee to be a function of minrelaytxfee, by default to a value of 136 satoshis
Hardcoded UTXO checkpoints are an enormous scalability improvement.
Update 3: Pieter Wuille convinced me in the comments of his Stack Exchange answer that these checkpoints don't give any material improvement over assumevalid and assumeutxo. He made me realize why my Case IV (see the other post) would not actually cause a huge disruption for assumevalid users. So I rescind my call for UTXO checkpoints. However, I maintain that UTXO checkpoints done properly (with checkpoints sufficiently in the past) are not a security model change and would not meaningfully alter consensus. It sounded like Pieter agreed with me on that point as well. I think UTXO checkpoints might still be a useful tool I will call for Assume UTXO tho. It plus assumevalid adds pretty much much all the same benefits as my proposal. OP: Hardcoded checkpoints are a piece of code in a Bitcoin node software source code that define a blockheight, a block hash, and a UTXO hash as valid. A new Bitcoin node would only need to validate blocks back to the golden blockheight, greatly reducing initial sync time. This would not change Bitcoin's security model. And while it does add a consensus rule, it would not actually ever have any significant likelihood of changing what the consensus is for which chain is the true chain as long as the checkpoints are taken from a non-contentious blockheight (say 1 month ago, since a reorg from a block 1 month ago is basically impossible). What checkpoints would do is allow much lower-power machines to be used as fully-validating nodes on the network, which would substantially increase Bitcoin's security. Luke Jr has been proposing lowering the blocksize to 300mb, and he has a point. Processor power is the bottleneck for spinning up new full nodes, and processor power isn't growing like it used to. Even tho he has a point, I believe that ship has sailed and it's unlikely that we'll roll back the max block size. But what that means is that even if we stay with the current max blocksize of around 2MB, initial sync time will go up and up for decades before coming back down to reasonable levels in over 40 years. That's a scary thought. Checkpoints is an alternative to that scenario that I believe has no downside, and only upsides. See the discussion happening on BitcoinDiscussion.
Kurt u/292 ✪ on Twitter: "Segwit transactions are invalid transactions wrapped in a software envelope that lies to nodes telling them that they are valid bitcoin transactions. In a sense, Segwit (and any other forward-compatible “soft fork” transaction) is malware living on the BTC network.
Why NYA is an attack on Bitcoin and why it will fail (long)
I wrote a rather lengthy response to a reddit post that I think is worth sharing, especially for newcomers to dispell some false narratives about S2X and Barry Silberts' New-York Agreement aka hostile takeover attempt of Bitcoin that is doomed to fail.
big block hard-liners wanted block size only, no SegWit.
Which doesn't make any logical sense. A lot of fud was actively being spread about how segwit was unsafe (such as the ANYONECANSPEND fud) but segwit is ofcourse working as intended thanks to the world class engineering of the Bitcoin Core developers. This led to the suspicion that BitMain was behind the opposition of segwit. BitMain miners use "covert AsicBoost" which is a technique that allows their rigs to use less electricity than competing mining equipment. However, segwit introduced changes to Bitcoin that made using covert AsicBoost impossible, which would explain their fierce opposition to segwit. We're talking big money here - the AsicBoost advantage is worth US$ 100 million according to estimates of experts. After segwit was finalized, the Bitcoin software was programmed to activate segwit but not before 95% of the hashpower signalled to be ready. After all, miners are tasked with creating valid blocks and should be given the opportunity to update their software for protocol changes such as segwit. As a courtesy to the miners, the Bitcoin software basically said: "ok, segwit is here, but I'll politely hold off its activation until 95% of you say that you're ready to deal with this protocol change". Sadly, mining is heavily centralized, and segwit was never getting activated due to the opposition of a few or perhaps even a single person: Jihan Wu of BitMain. As an aside, the centralization of hash power is also a direct result of AsicBoost. How this works: since AsicBoosted rigs are able to mine more efficiently than their competitors, these rigs drive up the difficulty and with that the average amount of hashes required to find a block. This in turn causes less efficient rigs to mine at a loss because they need to expend more energy to find a block. As a result, BitMain competitors got pushed out and BitMain became the dominant self-mining ASIC manufacturer. After segwit was finalized, it required 95% of the hashpower to activate but it never gained more than around 30%. So 70% of hash power abused the courtesy of the Bitcoin software to wait until they were ready for activation and refused to give the go ahead. This went on for months and worst case it would have taken until August 2018 before segwit would activate.
let's do a compromise- we do SegWit AND we hard fork
In March 2017 a pseudonymous user called Shaolin Fry created BIP148 which is a softfork that invalidates any block that wouldn't signal segwit readiness starting August 1st 2017. This also became known as the UASF (User-Activated Soft Fork, as opposed to the original miner-activated soft fork that didn't work as intended). This patch saw significant adoption and miners would soon be forced to signal segwit or else see their blocks being invalidated by the network, which would cause them significant financial losses. In May 2017 so after BIP148, the backroom New-York Agreement (NYA) was created by the Digital Currency Group of Barry Silbert together with businesses in the Bitcoin space such as BitPay and almost all miners. The NYA was the beginning of an outright misinformation campaign. The NYA was trumpeted to be a "compromise". Miners would finally agree to activate segwit. In return, Bitcoin would hardfork and double its capacity on top of the doubling already achieved by segwit. In reality, BIP148 was already going to force miners to signal the activation of segwit. Also, developers and most users were notably absent in this NYA. So, given that segwit was already unstoppable because of BIP148, the parties around the table had to "compromise" to do something that they all wanted: hardfork Bitcoin to increase its capacity. Or, is it all in fact really about increasing capacity? After all, segwit already achieved this. Bcash was created which doubled block size as well but without segwit. And then there is good old Litecoin having four times the transaction capacity of Bitcoin and segwit. Plenty of working alternatives that obsolete the need for yet another altcoin. So, perhaps transaction capacity is used as an excuse to reach a different goal. Let's explore. Apparently after not-so-careful study of the Bitcoin whitepaper, the NYA participants came up with an absurd redefinition of what is "Bitcoin". According to this bizarre definition, they started to claim that Bitcoin is being defined as:
Any blockchain that has the most cumulative hashpower behind it (measured from the Genesis block at the inception of Bitcoin):
Using the SHA256 hashing algorithm;
Having the current difficulty adjustment algorithm (resetting difficulty every 2016 blocks).
Ad 1. Note that it starts with "any blockchain". This also includes blockchains that contain invalid blocks, in other words, blocks that Bitcoin nodes would reject. This is ofcourse bizarre but it is exactly what the NYA participants claim. It effectively puts all power in the hand of miners. Instead of nodes validating blocks, according to this novel and absurd interpretation of Bitcoin it will be miners that call the shots. Whatever block a miner produces will be valid as long as they mine on top of their own block, because that chain will then have the most cumulative hash power. Nodes become mere distributors of blocks and lose all their authority as they can no longer decide over the validity of a block. MinerCoin is born. The Bitcoin whitepaper actually mentions this scenario where a majority of the hashpower takes over the network and starts producing invalid blocks and refers to it as being an attack. It is worth quoting this section 8, second paragraph in its entirety: "As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification." (emphasises mine). Any doubt left whether "most hashpower wins" is an attack should be removed by a telling remark in the release notes of 0.3.19: "Safe mode can still be triggered by seeing a longer (greater total PoW) invalid block chain." As mentioned, miners representing 95% of all hash power participate in the NYA. They are currently expressing their support for the NYA by putting "NYA" inside blocks. The NYA participants intend to remove their hash power from Bitcoin completely and point it towards their altcoin. To double down on their claim that Bitcoin is defined by hashpower, they show some serious audacity by referring to their altcoin as... "Bitcoin". Anyone not part of the NYA refers to their coin as segwit2x, S2X or sometimes 2x. The NYA participants proceed to proclaim victory. They reason that with all hash power on their blockchain and hardly any left for Bitcoin, "legacy Bitcoin" will be stuck as blocks will be created so slowly that Bitcoin becomes unusable, forcing everyone to switch to the "real" Bitcoin (sic). In other words, it was part of the plan was to remove hash power from Bitcoin to disrupt and force users into their altcoin. Ofcourse, Bitcoin Core would not just sit idle and let such an attack happen. There are several ways to defend against this attack. As a last resort, an emergency difficulty reset combined with a change in the PoW algorithm can be deployed to get Bitcoin going again. This is not likely to be necessary however as miners simply can't afford to mine a coin that has a small fraction of the value of Bitcoin. They have large bills to pay which is impossible by mining a coin that has half or even less the value of Bitcoin. In other words, miners would bankrupt themselves unless their altcoin attains the same value as Bitcoin. Given the lack of user, community and developer support it is save to say that this is not going to happen. Their coin will have only a small fraction of the value of Bitcoin and miners have no choice but to continue mine Bitcoin in order to receive the income necessary to pay for their huge operational expenses. A moment was set for the hardfork: block 494,784 a big block will be produced such that it is invalid for the current Bitcoin network and will discard it. Ofcourse, some nodes must accept the new, bigger S2X blocks. Therefore, Jeff Garzik (co-founder of a company called Bloq) started out to create btc1 which is a fork of the Bitcoin node software and which is adapted such that it accepts blocks up to twice in size, so that the segwit2x altcoin can exist. Note the 1 in btc1 which refers to their version numbering. Bitcoin Core releases are still 0.x but btc1 is numbered 1.x. This is to send the message that they have released the real Bitcoin that is now no longer a beta 0.x release but a production ready 1.x. This nonwithstanding the fact that btc1 is a copy of Bitcoin 0.14 with some minor changes and without any significant development causing it to quickly fall behind Bitcoin. The NYA participants go on to claim that when hash power is on the btc1 blockchain, and Bitcoin is dead as a result because no or hardly any new blocks are being created, then the Bitcoin Core developers have no choice but to start contributing to their btc1 github controlled by Jeff Garzik. In the NYA end state, Bitcoin is a coin of which miners set the consensus rules, and the Core developers sheepishly contribute to software in a repository controlled by Jeff Garzik or whoever pays him. Needless to say, this is never ever going to happen.
The small block hard-liners are now against 2x and want SegWit only.
There is no such thing as small block hardliners. As is probably clear by now, NYA is not about block size. It is about control over Bitcoin. As a matter of fact, Bitcoin Core has never closed the door on a block size increase. In the scaling roadmap published in December 2015, Bitcoin Core notes: "Finally--at some point the capacity increases from the above may not be enough. Delivery on relay improvements, segwit fraud proofs, dynamic block size controls, and other advances in technology will reduce the risk and therefore controversy around moderate block size increase proposals (such as 2/4/8 rescaled to respect segwit's increase). Bitcoin will be able to move forward with these increases when improvements and understanding render their risks widely acceptable relative to the risks of not deploying them. In Bitcoin Core we should keep patches ready to implement them as the need and the will arises, to keep the basic software engineering from being the limiting factor." Bitcoin Core literally says here very clearly that further increases of block size are on the table as an option in the future.
For my personal opinion-
I hope that your personal opinion has changed after taking notes of the above.
💡| Knuth is a high performance implementation of the Bitcoin Cash protocol focused on users requiring extra capacity and resilience. It is a full node software client, but also a development platform. It is designed for: miners, exchanges, app devolopers, block explorers and other businesses.
• Effective September 12th, 2019, U.S. customers to be blocked from trading on Binance.com.
CRYPTOCURRENCY TRADING SERVICES
• Polish cryptocurrency exchange Coinroom shuts down overnight and takes users funds • Coinbase now offers its crypto-to-Visa card for its users in Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. • On June 21st, 2019, Bittrex will restricts 32 token trading markets for its U.S. customers • Binance to launch new exchange focused on U.S. customers with FinCEN-registered partner BAM Trading Services. • Leading cryptocurrency derivatives exchange BitMEX reports an increase in attacks on user account credentials. As a result, withdrawal requests must be verified via email and the firm is looking to make 2FA mandatory on the platform.
• The mayor of Vancouver pushes for outright ban of crypto ATM’s in the city. A decision to regulate, monitor or ban will be reached by Q4 2019. • The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is set to finalize guidance for cryptocurrency businesses by June 21st, 2019. • In an official business plan issued by The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the regulatory body looks to apply existing securities regulations to address crypto assets by 2022. The watchdog will first research and identify emerging regulatory issues and then proposing solutions to mitigate them.
• Visa launches Visa B2B Connect Network, a service designed to help Visa’s corporate clients create near instant international payments powered by distributed ledger technology.
• The largest bank in South Korea, KB Kookmin is gearing up to launch a digital asset custody solution in partnership with blockchain start-up Atomrigs Lab. • Bakkt will begin user testing for its physically delivered Bitcoin futures product on July 22nd, 2019. • Facebook brings on Visa, Mastercard and PayPal as backers of its own cryptocurrency. Each of the firms will invest U.S. $10 million into a foundation that will govern the asset. The list has since included Ebay, Coinbase, Andreessen Horowitz, Mastercard and Stripe.
• Code contributor Michael Ford will join existing maintainers Wladimir van Der Laan, Jonas Schnelli, Marco Falke, and Samuel Dobson to maintain the latest version of the bitcoin node software. • The cryptocurrency arm of payments company Square has announced former Director at Google, Steve Lee as its first hire. • Chief Marketing Officer of ConsenSys, Amanda Gutterman steps down from her role and will instead remain as an advisor.
• @nic_carter – “The role of a Bitcoin evangelist should be to manage expectations, not to inflate them” • @nic_carter – “Bitcoin may well be environmentally costly, but it is absolutely worth it, even if it cost 10x more. Because Bitcoin disempowers debt-financed consumerism which the ultimate environmental scourge” • @barrysilbert – “The launch of Facebook's cryptocurrency will go down in history as THE catalyst that propelled digital assets (including bitcoin) to mass global consumer adoption. Will be remembered as just as important -- and transformative -- as the launch of the Netscape browser. Buckle up”
Michael Ford Named Newest Bitcoin Core Code Maintainer
Long-time Bitcoin Core contributor Michael Ford, who often goes by the handle “fanquake,” has been named the newest maintainer of the open-source software project. Ford will join the four other current Bitcoin Core maintainers — Wladimir van Der Laan, Jonas Schnelli, Marco Falke, and Samuel Dobson — in doing the “janitorial” work that keeps the most popular version of the bitcoin node software organized and moving forward. The decision was made at the last CoreDev meeting, an invite-only event which gathers many of the most active Bitcoin Core contributors a couple of times a year. As the developers are spread across the world and mostly chat online, this gives them some time to chat face-to-face. https://www.coindesk.com/michael-ford-named-newest-bitcoin-core-code-maintainer
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